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Nietzsche On Identity 
 
Eric Steinhart.  This article has been published as (2005) Nietzsche on identity.  Revista 
di Estetica 28 (1), 241-256. 
 
ABSTRACT: I gather and constructively criticize Nietzsche's writings on identity.  
Nietzsche treats identity as a logical fiction.  He denies that there are any enduring things 
(no substances); he denies that there are any indiscernible things in any respect (no 
universals, no bare particulars).  For Nietzsche, the world consists of durationless events 
bearing non-universal properties and standing to one another in non-universal relations.  
Events are bundles of tropes.  Nietzsche even denies self-identity.  His events are self-
differing trope-bundles.  I link Nietzsche's denial of self-identity with modern treatments 
of paradox. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Examining Nietzsche's Theory of Identity 
 
Nietzsche takes a strikingly skeptical view of identity.1  We are all too familiar, he thinks, 
with metaphysical and logical theories that carelessly affirm identity everywhere.  To 
avoid what he thinks are the deleterious consequences of such metaphysical and logical 
theories, Nietzsche strenuously denies that there is any identity anywhere.  Nietzsche is 
not the only thinker to challenge the logical supremacy of identity.  His denials of identity 
as equality and identity as endurance link him closely to modern ontologies involving 
tropes (rather than universals) and events (rather than substances). 
 
I aim to work out the logic of Nietzsche's world without identity.  Strikingly, his remarks 
on identity are often qualified by phrases like "in reality", "in fact", and "in truth".  I take 
it that remarks so qualified apply to the world as will to power (BGE2 22, 36; GM II:12; 
WP 1067).3  I have gathered Nietzsche's texts on identity,4 and sorted them into 
categories according to contemporary logical work on identity.  I provide close analytic 
and critical commentary on these texts.  While I try to stay very close to Nietzsche's 
writings, I do not hesitate to fill in the conceptual gaps he sometimes leaves.  My 
criticism is constructive.  I also try to follow the implications of his theory of identity 
using techniques from modern logic and mathematics.  My present account aims to 
provide premises for further work on the role of identity both in Nietzsche's system5 and 
in logic generally.  Much work remains to be done in this area.6   Nietzsche's theory of 
identity points toward a profoundly non-Aristotelian logic and metaphysics.  Nietzsche 
argues that the higher emerges from the lower: altruism emerges out of egoism, truth 
emerges out of error, logic emerges from illogic (HH 1; GS 111; BGE 2; TI 3:4-6).  Just 
so, identity emerges out of difference.  Of course, the identity that does emerge from 
difference is merely apparent. 
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1.2 Many Senses of Identity 
 
Identity is a subtle and logically challenging relation.7  There are many senses of 
identity.8  Nietzsche will deny the reality of almost all of them, claiming that "unity, 
identity, duration, substance, cause, materiality, being" are errors (TI 3:5).  Here I provide 
a brief taxonomy of identity relations; other taxonomies are possible.  I do not offer this 
taxonomy dogmatically; I offer it only to use it as a tool to clarify Nietzsche's concepts.   
 
Among the many senses of identity, two are primary: (1) identity as endurance, and (2) 
identity as equality.  There is a difference.  Suppose you and I are playing a chess game.  
A friend present at the start may come back later, see us playing some chess game in its 
end stages, and ask whether we are playing the same game.  We might be playing the 
same game in the sense that (1) we are continuing our play (we didn't start a new game), 
or in the sense that (2) we are repeating our play (we wrote down the moves, and we are 
replaying the game).  The first sense is endurance; the second is equality. 
 
Identity as endurance is identity through time.  It is also known as diachronic identity, 
more rarely as genidentity.  It always involves temporal difference.  Endurance has two 
main logical forms.  First: x at time t1 is the same as y at time t2, where t1 and t2 are 
different times.  For example: the man who was Governor of Arkansas in 1980 is the 
same as the man who is President in 1999.  Second: x at t1 is the same F as y at t2, where 
F denotes some type or sort of thing.  For example: the girl in that picture is the same 
person as the woman I married.  Because the term F specifies some sort of thing, it is 
known as a sortal term.  The sortal F restricts the comparison to things that are F's: x at t1 
is an F, y at t2 is an F, and x at t1 is one and the same as y at t2.  While the logical detail 
may be tiresome, the restriction to F's is important.  For instance, since the material in our 
bodies is always being replaced, it might be true that you are the same person and the 
same organism as you were 10 years ago, but you are not the same material thing as you 
were 10 years ago. 
 
Identity as equality differs from identity as endurance because time is not at issue.  Either 
the identified objects are simultaneous or timeless.  Identity as equality is indiscernibility.  
Equality comes in three main logical forms: (1) x is one and the same as y; (2) x is one 
and the same F as y; (3) x is the same F as y.  The first expresses the absolute numerical 
identity of x and y: x is y.   In traditional logic, each thing is one and the same as itself: 
Socrates is one and the same as Socrates.  The second form is numerical-identity relative 
to the sortal term F.  So: Cicero is one and the same man as Tully, the Morning Star is 
one and the same star as the Evening Star.  Again, the sortal restricts the comparison to 
things that are F's: x is one and the same F as y means that x is an F, y is an F, and x is 
one and the same as y.  So: Cicero is not one and the same man as the Morning Star.  
Finally, the third form is type-identity.  It is also sortal-relative, since you have to specify 
the type or sort involved.  If you hold a copy of Plato's Republic in your left hand, and 
another copy in your right hand, then the book in your right hand is the same book as the 
book in your left hand, but it is not one and the same book as the book in your left hand.  
This is the distinction between types and tokens.  For example, "hello" and "hello" are 
two word-tokens of one word-type; so, "hello" is the same word as "hello", but "hello" is 
 3 
not one and the same word as "hello".  The two words are type-identical, but not token-
identical.   
 
 
2. Nietzsche on Types and Tokens 
 
2.1 The World of Identical Cases 
 
When Nietzsche talks about identity, he often talks about "identical cases" (WP 512, 521, 
532, 544, 551, 568, 569).  He says we live in a "world of identical cases" (WP 521).  
Identical cases are different tokens of some one type.  High-level cognitive operations, 
such as judgment, logical and mathematical reasoning, and linguistic communication, 
presuppose identical cases.  These operations presuppose that the mind experiences 
things as tokens of types, as instances of concepts.  Judgment is the mental act of binding 
particulars to universals (that is, to concepts); it is the act of classifying: "Judgment -- this 
is the belief: 'This and that are so.'  Thus there is in every judgment the avowal of having 
encountered an 'identical case'" (WP 532).  The belief 'This and that are so' brings the 
individuals x and y under a common concept F: this (x) and that (y) are F, that is, F(x) 
and F(y).  It is the recognition that the particulars x and y are tokens of type F.  The 
recognition of identical cases is necessary for linguistic communication, since language 
applies one word to many things: "for there to be communication something has to be 
firm, simplified, capable of precision (above all in the identical case)" (WP 569).  For 
instance: the word "man" is applied to Socrates and to Plato; if we say: "Socrates is a 
man" and "Plato is a man", we are saying that the particulars Socrates and Plato are 
tokens of the type "man".  They are identical cases.  Since logic uses the subject-predicate 
schema taken from ordinary language, "logic is bound to the condition: assume there are 
identical cases" (WP 512).  Likewise, mathematics presupposes identical cases: "The 
calculability of an event . . . resides in the recurrence of 'identical cases" (WP 551).  It 
presupposes them for counting.  To count the number of apples in a box is to count the 
number of tokens of the type apple.  Likewise for measurement operations: weighing is 
counting the number (say) of grams of something, surveying is counting the number (say) 
of meters from here to there.  In each case, what is counted or measured is tokens of the 
type gram or type meter. 
 
Identical cases (tokens of types) are fabricated for higher-level cognitive operations by 
lower-level cognitive processes, such as perception.9  The world of identical cases is the 
phenomenal world of human subjective experience: "the world of 'phenomena' is the 
adapted world which we feel to be real.  The 'reality' lies in the continual recurrence of 
identical, familiar, related things in their logicized character" (WP 569).  Nietzsche thinks 
that tokens of types are constructed by comparisons within perception: "in a world where 
there is no being, a certain calculable world of identical cases must first be created 
through appearances: a tempo at which observation and comparison are possible" (WP 
568).  Things do not naturally fall under types; they do not naturally come to us as tokens 
of type: the unconscious mind classifies things for us, so that we consciously experience 
every individual x as an instance (token) of some concept (type) F.  Nietzsche says: 
"Before there is 'thought' there must have been 'invention'; the construction of identical 
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cases, of the appearance of sameness, is more primitive than the knowledge of sameness" 
(WP 544); "There would be nothing that could be called knowledge if thought did not 
first re-form the world in this way into 'things', into what is self-identical" (WP 574; cf. 
WP 516).  Again: "All knowledge which is of assistance to us involves the identification 
of things which are not the same, of things which are only similar" (PT, p. 51; Nietzsche's 
italics). 
 
2.2 The World Of Identical Cases Is Fictitious 
 
The existence of identical cases is merely apparent: "The principle of identity has behind 
it the 'apparent fact' of things that are the same" (WP 520).   The apparent fact that things 
are the same is justified by "the utilitarian fact that only when we see things coarsely and 
made equal do they become calculable and usable to us" (WP 515).  The pragmatic value 
of identity is ultimately biological: "Life is founded upon the premise of a belief in 
enduring and regularly recurring things" (WP 552).  Those animals "who did not know 
how to find often enough what is 'equal' as regards both nourishment and hostile animals 
. . . were favored with a lesser probability of survival than those who guessed 
immediately upon encountering similar instances that they must be equal" (GS 111).  
 
The existence of identical cases is not just an apparent fact; worse, it is sheer fiction: 
"Logic is bound to the condition: assume there are identical cases.  In fact, to make 
possible logical thinking and inferences, this condition must first be treated fictitiously as 
fulfilled.  That is: the will to logical truth can be carried through only after a fundamental 
falsification of all events is assumed" (WP 512).  If that is correct, then there are no 
identical cases in the world as will to power: there are no tokens of types.  Organisms like 
us, with minds like ours, regularize our experience to produce the fictions of identical 
things: "It is we who created the 'thing,' the 'identical thing,' subject, attribute, activity, 
object, substance, form, after we had long pursued the process of making identical, coarse 
and simple.  The world seems logical to us because we have made it logical" (WP 521).  
While Kant tried to argue that "The basic laws of logic, the law of identity and the law of 
contradiction, are forms of pure knowledge"; Nietzsche instead asserts that "these are not 
forms of knowledge at all!  they are regulative articles of belief" (WP 530). 
 
2.3 The Fabrication of Identical Cases 
 
The cognitive mechanisms that produce identity produce both identity as endurance and 
identity as equality. Endurance and equality are illusions produced when the mind 
associates a new perception with a merely similar old memory.  Different phenomenal 
tokens are made into identical cases, that is, into tokens of the same conceptual type, by 
the fusion of memory with perception: I remember that x and I perceive that y, because x 
is similar to y, I identify x with y; since y is past and x is present, I conclude that there is 
some one thing (a substance) that has endured from the time I perceived y to the time I 
perceive x.   As the mind receives new sensory inputs, it sorts them into categories it has 
already formed: "In our thought, the essential feature is fitting new material into old 
schemas. . . making equal what is new" (WP 499); "there is in every judgment the avowal 
of having encountered an 'identical case': it therefore presupposes comparison with the 
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aid of memory" (WP 532).  The man engaged in moral reflection "experiences psychical 
pleasure or displeasure through comparing his present states with past ones and declaring 
them identical or not identical (as happens in all recollection)" (WS 12).  Many 
individuals are subsumed under one species (under one concept) due to the similarity of 
their forms.  The form is an equality that endures: "The form counts as something 
enduring . . . but the form has merely been invented by us; and however often 'the same 
form is attained,' it does not mean that it is the same form -- what appears is always 
something new, and it is only we, who are always comparing, who include the new, to the 
extent that it is similar to the old, in the unity of the 'form.'" (WP 521).  The power of the 
living, thinking organism is its ability to "assimilate the new to the old, to simplify the 
manifold . . . to file new things in old files" (BGE 230; GS 114).  Nietzsche describes two 
main cognitive mechanisms for the production of identity: (1) feature deletion and (2) 
feature blurring. 
 
The first cognitive mechanism for the production of identity is feature deletion: the less 
salient or striking features of distinct perceptual experiences are ignored.  Feature 
deletion is central to concept formation: "Every concept arises from the equation of 
unequal things.  Just as it is certain that one leaf is never totally the same as another, so it 
is certain that the concept 'leaf' is formed by arbitrarily discarding these individual 
differences and by forgetting the distinguishing aspects. . . . We obtain the concept, as we 
do the form, by overlooking what is individual" (PT, p. 83).  The mind sees a 
(phenomenal) thing x with some set of features.  The thing x is a "unique and entirely 
individual original experience" (PT, p. 83).  Some of the features of x are perceptually 
striking.   For example, suppose that the set of features of x is {A, B, C, D, E}, and the 
set of striking features of x is {C, D, E}.  The mind names x with an internal word: "leaf".    
Some time later, the mind sees another (phenomenal) thing y with some set of features.  
For example, the set of features of y is {C, D, E, F, G, H}, and the set of striking features 
of y is {C, D, E}.  Because the striking features of "leaf" are the same as those of y, the 
(phenomenal) thing y is associated with the same internal word "leaf".  The word "leaf" 
has become a concept: it applies to many things.  The concept leaf is now associated with 
the striking features common to x and to y, that is, with the set {C, D, E}.  The individual 
features of the first thing x and the second thing y are ignored (PT, p. 51).  The result is 
that x and y become identical cases; they become tokens of the type leaf.  So: x is a leaf, 
and y is a leaf.  The essential features of this type are the striking features C, D, and E 
that x and y share in common. 
 
The second cognitive mechanism for the production of identity is feature blurring.  It is a 
kind of confusion that precedes judgment and subject-predicate cognition.  The higher-
level processes of judgment depend on the lower-level equalization within perception: 
"There could be no judgments at all if a kind of equalization were not practiced within 
sensations" (WP 532).  Indeed, many higher-level cognitive processes depend on this 
equalization: "All thought, judgment, perception, considered as comparison, has as its 
precondition a 'positing of equality,' and earlier still a 'making equal.'" (WP 501).  The 
original equalization practiced by human cognition occurs in sensation: "That weak 
sensations are regarded as alike, sensed as being the same, is the fundamental fact.  Thus 
confusion of two sensations that are close neighbors" (WP 506).  The mind blurs similar 
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sensations into identical sensations: "the coarser organ sees much apparent equality" (WP 
511).  In his discussion of concept formation by feature deletion, much equalization has 
already occurred: the phenomenal things already have features that are regularized, 
logicized.  For example, the shapes and colors of the two leaves x and y are already 
sufficiently blurred that there is no noticeable difference between them.  If the features of 
sensations are blurred into equality, that presupposes that they are not equal.  Prior to 
blurring, all sensory qualities are individual; they are particular qualities.  Qualities like 
redness are usually thought of not as particulars, but as universals shared by many 
sensations: this sensation x is red, and that sensation y is red.  In subject-predicate logic: 
red(x) and red(y).  This is what Nietzsche denies.  Instead of sharing any common 
property, sensations x and y have their own individual colors: x is red1 and y is red2.  
These two individual colors are blurred or averaged into the shared (fictitious) color red, 
so, after blurring, x is red and y is red.   
 
 
3. Against Identity as Endurance 
 
3.1 That There Are No Enduring Things 
 
Nietzsche, not surprisingly, denies any eternal endurance: "There are no eternally 
enduring substances; matter is as much of an error as the God of the Eleatics." (GS 109; 
WP 552d)   Further, Nietzsche denies all endurance.  He says it is an error that "there are 
enduring things." (GS 110).  Identity as endurance is an old mistake: "To the plants all 
things are usually in repose, eternal, every thing identical with itself.  It is from the period 
of the lower organisms that man has inherited the belief that there are identical things. . . . 
belief in unconditioned substances and in identical things is likewise a primary, ancient 
error" (HH 18).  Duration is illusory: "Duration, identity with itself, being are . . . 
complexes of events apparently durable in comparison with other complexes" (WP 552c).  
Nietzsche says that "nothing in the real world corresponds" to identity through time; he 
says there is no thing that is "identical at different points of time." (HH 11)   So, all 
sentences like "The shirt in your hand now is the same shirt as the shirt you wore last 
Friday" are false.   
 
A substance is something that remains the same through change.  There are no 
unchanging substances in chemistry: "To assert that diamond, graphite, and carbon are 
identical is to read off the facts naively from the surface" (WP 623).  Identical cases in 
logic are beings that remain the same (enduring substances): "In order to think and infer it 
is necessary to assume beings: logic handles only formulas for what remains the same" 
(WP 517).  The identical cases of logic are substances with attributes, which provide the 
truth-conditions for subject-predicate reasoning.  Nietzsche denies that there are any 
substances.10  It is a useful error that "there are equal things; that there are things, 
substances, bodies." (GS 110); "being is an empty fiction" (TI 3:2).  There are no 
substances: "in the strictest sense, nothing real corresponds to" the concept of substance. 
(GS 111)  The concept of enduring substances emerges because the organisms that 
blurred their experience into an unchanging background "had an advantage over those 
that saw everything 'in flux'" (GS 111). 
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Nietzsche speculates that "a kind of becoming must itself create the deception of beings" 
(WP 517).  The becoming that creates the deception of beings is the reflexivity of 
thinking.  Human reason falsifies the data it receives from the senses.  Sensation reveals 
no duration; but reason introduces "the lie of unity, the lie of materiality, of substance, of 
duration" into the data of experience (TI 3:2).  We derive all our beliefs in enduring 
substances (in beings, enduring individual units, atoms of existence) from our belief that 
the reasoning ego is an enduring substance (WP 481 - 488, 517 - 519, 786).  The ego is a 
doer added to the deeds of thinking (WP 488).  The ego is an illusory constancy in the 
process of thinking (BGE 12, 16, 17, 19).11  In particular, the fiction of the enduring ego 
leads to the fiction of the material atom (BGE 12; WP 625, 634, 635).  Nietzsche denies 
that there is any enduring ego.  Instead of an immortal soul, Nietzsche posits the 
occurrence of mortal souls (BGE 12; WP 489 - 492).  So, he denies that physical atoms 
exist (BGE 12; WP 552, 624, 636, 689, 704); there are no "durable ultimate units, no 
atoms, no monads" (WP 715). 
 
3.2 A World of Durationless Events 
 
We have an idea of enduring things; we think of things as temporally extended 
substances that remain the same through change of attributes.  Nietzsche says that our 
idea of enduring things is fictitious, that nothing in the real world corresponds to our idea 
of endurance.  If he is correct, then there are no enduring things in the real world, that is, 
in the world as will to power.  Everything real is temporally unextended; the world as 
will to power consists of durationless events.  The will to power is a plenum of events 
(WP 520, 521, 548 - 552, 635).  It is a set of deeds without doers (BGE 17; TI 3:5; WP 
484, 488, 531, 548, 631).   If we eliminate all our fictional projections into phenomena, 
then "no things remain but only dynamic quanta" (WP 635). These dynamical quanta are 
centers of force (WP 567, 568, 636). He says: "We may venture to speak of atoms and 
monads in a relative sense", and these are not enduring things, but events; Nietzsche's 
dynamical quanta are "treaty drafts of will that are constantly increasing or losing their 
power" (WP 715). 
 
The world as will to power is a totality of durationless events.  However, these events are 
not substances; they are not even instantaneous substances.  Aristotelian subject-predicate 
logic is not appropriate for these events: "If I say 'lightning flashes', I have posited the 
flash once as an activity and a second time as a subject, and thus added to the event a 
being that is not one with the event but is rather fixed, is, and does not 'become'" (WP 
531).  If events are not substances, then they do not have properties as substances have 
attributes.  If events are not substances, not even instantaneously, then events are not self-
identical at all, not even for an instant.  If the world as will to power is ultimately a 
continuous flux (WS 11; GS 111, 112; WP 604), then there are no things that are self-
identical for any longer than an instant and there are no things that are self-identical even 
for an instant.  There simply are no things at all (WP 520, 634). 
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4. Against Identity as Equality 
 
4.1 Nietzsche on the Identity of Indiscernibles 
 
Nietzsche says that the dominant tendency of living things is "to treat as equal what is 
merely similar"; but this is an "illogical tendency, for nothing is really equal" (GS 111).  
Nietzsche does not define "equality".  Since Nietzsche often adopts Leibnizian concepts, 
one guess is that equality is Leibnizian indiscernibility:12 x equals y if and only if, for 
every property p, p(x) if and only if p(y).  So, the claim that nothing is really equal 
amounts to the claim that there are no numerically distinct but indiscernible things: if x is 
not one and the same as y, then x is not equal to y.  Equivalently: if x equals y, then x is 
one and the same as y.  This principle is known as the Identity of Indiscernibles.  
 
The analysis of equality in Leibnizian terms is backed up by Nietzsche's example of the 
leaves: "it is certain that one leaf is never totally the same as another" (PT, p. 83).  The 
example occurs in Leibniz.  Here Nietzsche is surely invoking indiscernibility: it is 
certain that, if x is a leaf, y is a leaf, and x is not one and the same as y, then x does not 
equal y.   Nietzsche also asserts that if x is a human being, y is a human being, and x is 
not one and the same as y, then it is not the case that x equals y.  Human beings and their 
lives are unique parts of the universe and do not occur multiply but indiscernably: "In his 
heart every man knows quite well that, being unique, he will be in the world only once 
and that no imaginable chance will for a second time gather together into a unity so 
strangely variegated an assortment like he is" (UM 3, p. 127); "everyone must have his 
own individual opinion concerning everything about which an opinion is possible, 
because he himself is an individual, unique thing which adopts a new posture towards all 
other things such as has never been adopted before" (HH 286).  Nietzsche applies the 
same reasoning to human actions: "there neither are nor can be actions that are the same; 
that every action that has ever been done was done in an altogether unique and 
irretrievable way, and that this will be equally true of every future action" (GS 335); "all 
our actions are altogether incomparably personal, unique, and infinitely individual" (GS 
354).  If my analysis is correct, then Nietzsche's assertion that "nothing is really equal" is 
the claim that nothing is really indiscernible.  The Identity of Indiscernibles holds in the 
world as will to power because there are no indiscernibles in the world as will to power.  
It could be otherwise: there could be two things x and y such that x is not one and the 
same as y, but x equals y.  Black, for instance, describes a universe containing two equal 
yet numerically distinct spheres.13   
 
In a remark on numbers, Nietzsche says: "The invention of the laws of numbers was 
made on the basis of the error . . . that there are identical things (but in fact nothing is 
identical with anything else); at least that there are things (but there is no 'thing')." (HH 
I:19)  Here the attack on identity is not on identity as continuity or endurance.  The claim 
that "in fact nothing is identical with anything else" is trivially true if "is identical with" 
means "is one and the same with".  So, if Nietzsche means to say something, then he 
must be talking about type-identity.  His statement, fully articulated, is "in fact nothing is 
type-identical with anything else".  So, it is false to say that "This sentence is me" is type-
identical with "This sentence is me".  Likewise, for any type or concept F, it is false to 
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say that F(x) and F(y).  If I am right that "identical cases" are tokens of types, then my 
claim that he denies that there are any type-identical things coheres with his assertions 
that identical cases are fictions.  Nietzsche's next sentence seems to validate this 
interpretation: "The assumption of plurality always presupposes the existence of 
something that occurs more than once: but precisely here error already holds sway, here 
already we are fabricating beings, unities which do not exist" (HH I:19).  The "something 
that occurs more than once" is the universal that is repeated in the plurality.  If I say 
"This is a leaf" and "That is a leaf", then I have taken two things x and y as tokens of the 
type leaf.  I have identified them under the type leaf.  I do not know if I am right in 
interpreting Nietzsche's remark as a denial of type-identity, but if I am, then Nietzsche's 
position is far more radical than the claim that the Identity of Indiscernibles holds in the 
world as will to power.  To deny that any things are type-identical is to say that for any x 
and y, there are no respects at all in which x equals y.  
 
Every world of traditional subject-predicate logic (every model of a subject-predicate 
theory) consists of a set of substances and a set of attributes.  Suppose there is a trivial 
substance-attribute world consisting of the four substances {A, B, C, D} and the four 
attributes {white, black, round, square}.  In this world, A is round and white; B is round 
and black; C is square and white; D is square and black.  The Identity of Indiscernibles 
holds in this world: there are no substances x and y such that, for every property p in P, 
p(x) if and only if p(y).  Still, if we focus on some set of properties smaller than the 
whole set P, we do find that there are identical substances.  For instance: A is the same 
shape as B; C is the same shape as D; A is the same color as C; B is the same color as D.  
To deny type-identity is to assert that no numerically-distinct substances share any 
attributes.  If x and y are substances, and if x is not one and the same as y, then there is no 
attribute p such that p(x) and p(y).  For instance, there is no color C such that C(x) and 
C(y); there is no shape S such that S(x) and S(y).  In traditional logic, the extension of a 
predicate is the set of substances of which it is true.  To deny type-identity is to assert that 
the extension of every predicate is a set with only one member, since no predicate is true 
of more than one subject.  If we classify many particulars under some universal provided 
by language, we are guilty of logical error (GS 354; BGE 260).  Just so, moral rules and 
regulations "may lead to some semblance of sameness, but really only to some 
semblance" (GS 335; WS 11).  No attributes are shared by many substances.  Universals 
are at most concepts. 
 
If my analysis is correct, then all predicates (all linguistic terms that denote properties or 
relations) refer to particulars.   There are no predicates p such that, for any x and any y, if 
x is not one and the same as y, p(x) and p(y).  At most, x and y have similar predicates.  
So: it is never the case that x is red and y is red, rather, x has its own redness red1(x) and 
y has its own redness red2(y), and red1 resembles red2, so that x resembles y.  The 
properties red1 and red2 are individual properties.  In contemporary metaphysics, 
particularized properties (and particularized relations) are known as tropes.14   So, if this 
analysis is right, Nietzsche has a trope ontology.  No thing is type-identical with any 
other thing; at most, things resemble one another.15   Even more: if all unity is "unity only 
as organization and cooperation" (WP 561; cf. WP 489, 490, 492), then unitary things are 
merely bundles of tropes (WP 558).16  If this is right, then we can see how all tropes are 
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more or less similar.  While tropes like the red1 and red2 are easily seen to be similar 
(they are, say, shades of one another), it is harder to explain how color-tropes such as 
red1 are similar to shape-tropes (such as square1), or to size-tropes (such as small1).  One 
possible explanation is that such tropes are more or less spatially or temporally similar: 
while red1 has neither any chromatic nor geometric similarity to square1, its spatio-
temporal location is more or less similar to the spatio-temporal location of square1.  If 
red1, square1, and small1 are sufficiently spatially and temporally similar, then we take to 
be in the same bundle, which is one thing.  This analysis applies just as well to, say, the 
charge, mass, and spin tropes of electrons. 
 
4.2 Nietzsche on the Indiscernibility of Identicals 
 
The Identity of Indiscernibles (which seems to hold in the world as will to power) is 
contrasted with the Indiscernibility of Identicals.  The Indiscernibility of Identicals is also 
known as Leibniz's Law.17  Leibniz's Law says: if x is one and the same as y, then x 
equals y.  More formally: if x is one and the same as y, then for every property p, p(x) if 
and only if p(y).  Nietzsche appears to deny that Leibniz's Law holds in the world as will 
to power.  The existence of "self-identical" things is presupposed "by every proposition 
of logic" (WP 516).  Yet self-identity is a logical fiction (BGE 4).18   
 
Aristotelian logic "handles only formulas for what remains the same" (WP 517).  If 
Aristotelian logic is a falsification of events, then the "character of the world in a state of 
becoming" cannot be formulated according to the subject-predicate syntax of Aristotelian 
logic.  So, relative to that logic, the world as will to power, the world as a continuous flux 
(WS 11; GS 112) is "false" and "self-contradictory".  Nietzsche says: "There are no facts, 
everything is in flux" (WP 604).  He says "Continual transition forbids us to speak of 
'individuals,' etc.; the 'number' of beings is itself in flux" (WP 520).  If we deny that there 
is even instantaneously any self-identical A, then for every event A in the world as will to 
power, A is not one and the same as A.  At most, every event A in the world as will to 
power, A resembles A.  Events are not self-identical; events only resemble themselves.  
This sets up a dynamical tension within the event.  The law of non-contradiction no 
longer applies to them: events in the world as will to power are self-contradictory (WP 
517, 584, 1067).   
 
It is hard to see how it is even possible for events in the world as will to power to not be 
self-identical.  If Nietzsche seriously denies the reflexivity of identity, then his world as 
will to power looks absurd.  The will to power is not real but surreal.19  Every event is a 
self-differing coincidence of opposites.  Still, I want to try to make sense of Nietzsche's 
claims.  I reason as follows: (1) the world as will to power is a network of interrelated 
self-differing objects; (2) theories that have the world as will to power as their models 
must be networks of interrelated self-differing propositions; (3) self-differing 
propositions are logical paradoxes; (4) theories of will to power are networks of 
interrelated logical paradoxes. 
 
The world as will to power is a relational system.20  Natural science concerns relations: 
"All laws of nature are only relations between x, y, and z.  We define laws of nature as 
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relations to an x, y, and z -- each of which we are in turn acquainted with only in relation 
to other x, y, and z's." (PT, p. 51); "what is a law of nature as such for us?  We are not 
acquainted with it in itself, but only with its effects, which means in its relation to other 
laws of nature -- which, in turn, are known to us only as sums of relations" (PT, p. 87).  If 
this is right, then the physical universe is nothing but a network of relational things (PTG, 
p. 53).  These things are not isolated things-in-themselves (WP 553 - 569).  The very 
concept "thing" is relational (WP 583).  The properties of things come from their 
relations with other things: "The properties of a thing are effects on other 'things'" (WP 
557).21   The world as will to power is "essentially a world of relationships" (WP 568); it 
is a network of interrelated dynamical force-points (WP 567); it is a world in which 
"everything is bound to and conditioned by everything else" (WP 584, 765, 1032; TI 6:8).  
Every quantum of will to power "affects the whole of being" (WP 634, 636); the world as 
will to power is a network of "dynamic quanta" in relations of tension "to all other 
dynamic quanta"; the essence "lies in their relation to all other quanta" (WP 635).  If 
these force-points are self-differing events, then the world as will to power is a network 
of interrelated self-differing events.  The differences of these events are coordinated in a 
kind of anti-harmony.  Writing on Heraclitus (PTG 5 - 8), Nietzsche calls this concord-
in-strife. 
 
Logic itself is entirely relational: "The entire domain of 'true-false' applies only to 
relations, not to an 'in-itself' -- There is no 'essence-in-itself' (it is only relations that 
constitute an essence)" (WP 625).  If Nietzschean logic is about anything, then its models 
are networks of self-differing force-points.  Modern work on paradox defines theories 
that have such models.  Logical paradoxes are propositions whose truth-values are self-
contradictory; such propositions are not self-identical, in the sense that they are not self-
consistent.  Since Nietzsche occasionally describes the world as will to power in 
paradoxical terms (WP 639, 712, 1067; BGE 22, 56), systems of paradoxical propositions 
may serve as good theories of the world as will to power.22  The Liar paradox, Russell's23 
paradox, and Grelling's24 paradox are instances of paradoxes through direct self-
reference.  The Liar paradox is the sentence "This sentence is false".  If "This sentence is 
false" is true, then it is false; if it is false, then it is true.  The Liar directly refers to itself.  
Its self-reference is self-negation.  So, the Liar is not self-equivalent; it is self-
contradictory.  Its self-contradiction is Heraclitean concord-in-strife (PTG 5 - 8).  While 
the Liar is just one proposition, there are systems in which many propositions interact 
paradoxically.  Such systems are paradoxical through indirect self-reference.  For 
instance, in the Middle Ages Buridan defined a system known as the Dualist: Socrates 
says "Plato speaks falsely"; Plato says "Socrates speaks truly".  If S is the proposition 
Socrates utters and P is the proposition Plato utters, then S refers to P and P refers to S.  
The truth-values of the P and S are defined circularly: each is defined in terms of the 
other.  It is possible to construct large networks of propositions whose truth-values are all 
defined circularly, in terms of one another, by indirect self-reference.25   
 
If networks of paradoxically interrelated propositions are good theories of the world as 
will to power, 26 then indeed "the entire domain of 'true-false' applies only to relations".  
Here I consider a few aspects of those theories.  If every property of every thing is the 
effect of that thing on other things, then the properties of those other things are the effects 
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of those other things on still other things.  Either this network of referred effects goes on 
to infinity or else each property in the network is ultimately defined circularly in terms of 
relational variations of itself.  Since Nietzsche says that the world as will to power is only 
finitely complex (Z III:10/1; WP 595, 1062, 1066, 1067),27 the network of propositional 
references does not go on to infinity.  Each proposition is ultimately defined circularly in 
terms of itself.  In other words, the network of mutually referring propositions is logically 
closed.  In such networks, truth-values must be assigned to all the propositions at once; 
each proposition conditions all the others.  There are, necessarily, many possible truth-
value assignments that satisfy all the relations among the propositions; each assignment is 
equivalent to every other assignment.  That's why the system is paradoxical.  Truth-value 
assignments are superimposed on one another; many mutually incompatible truth-value 
assignments coincide.  They are all compressed into a surreal unity.  As such a unity, the 
system is surely chaotic (GS 109; WP 1067).  One way to break up this chaotic unity is 
by associating each proposition with a point in space, and each truth-value assignment 
with a moment in time (so, each truth-value assignment to the whole network assigns one 
truth-value to each point in space).  If truth-value assignment T1 implies T2, the 
implication can be construed as a transition or change.  In many cases, there are cycles of 
truth-value assignments: T1 implies T2, T2 implies T3, and so on to Tn, but Tn in turn 
implies T1.  In such cases, there is a periodic cycle of states of the network.  Here is 
where one might situate the eternal return of the same as a logical feature of any universe.  
Given Nietzsche's strong denials of indiscernibility, the recurrence of "the same" is at 
most some cosmic combination of tropes resembling some earlier cosmic combination.  
For such resemblance, one must trade in two-valued logic for some kind of fuzzy logic. 
   
5. Conclusion 
 
An early remark on Heraclitus's conception of becoming unites Nietzsche's criticisms of 
identity as endurance and identity as equality.  Heraclitus conceived of becoming "under 
the form of polarity, as being the diverging of a force into two qualitatively different 
opposed activities that seek to re-unite.  Everlastingly, a given quality contends against 
itself and separates into opposites; everlastingly these opposites seek to re-unite"; 
opposites are "attached to one another and interlocked at any given moment like wrestlers 
of whom sometimes the one, sometimes the other is on top" (PTG p. 54).  Accordingly, 
becoming consists of pairs of particularized qualities (tropes) that are both opposed to 
and bound to one another.  Just so, paradoxes like "This sentence is false" bind true and 
false.  The tension is dynamical: these opposed tropes are dynamical quanta of will to 
power.  Pluralities of these opposed tropes stand in logical relations of indirect 
paradoxical self-reference.  Within the network of opposed tropes there are tightly bound 
knots or bundles (WP 558, 561) that we (falsely) think of as unified self-identical 
enduring substances bearing universals.  Identity, for Nietzsche, emerges from difference.  
Nietzsche challenges us to think of difference as logically prior to identity.  Whether 
thought can meet this challenge remains to be seen. 
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